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In the Supretne Court
of the State of Utah
SOREN J. JESPERSEN, ROY H.
EAST, HOWARD J. HASSELL
and ROY vV. BROvVN, doing business as POWER ENGINEERI~O
CO~fP ANY, a partnership,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
7443

vs.

DESERET NEWS PUBLISHING
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPOHDEHTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs agree with the defendant's statement
of facts as contained in the defendant's brief and designated as "Statement of the Case" and "Admitted
Facts" with the additions and corrections nPxt hereinafter noted.
The defendant examined the premises and particularly the support of the flooring (R. 113, 115, 116,
117 and 205) prior to the leasing.
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The following is the description of the demised
premises as contained in the said lease:
''The west one hundred forty-five feet (145')
of that certain building known as building numbered one eighty one (181) located at 1710 South
Redwood Road." (R. 4.)
The lease by and between the parties to this action
contained the following language with regard to attorney's fees:
''Also that the said lessee will pay * * •
together with all costs and attorney's fees and
expenses that shall arise from enforcing the covenants of this lease. * * *" (R. 5.)
It is not e~pressly stated whether the leased premises includes the land under the building leased (R. 4)
and plaintiff discusses in point III the construction
of the lease in that regard.
The plaintiff at no time during the continuance of
the lease accepted nor agreed to :any surrender of the
leased premises (R. 105).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

The evidence is sufficient to support finding No. 3
to the effect that the defendant stored certain materials
in such a manner as to break the floor and cause damage
and to support finding No. 4 to the effect that such
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damage did not result from reasonable use and wear
or from damage by the elen1ents.
PoiNT II.
The evidence is sufficient to support finding No. 5
to the effect that ;the reasonable cost of repairing the
damage is $3,000.00.
POINT III.
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding
that the defendant is liable for rent.
PoiNT IV.
Plaintiffs should be awarded additional attorney's
fees.
ARGUMENT APPLICABLE TO POINTS
I, II AND III
Since defendant's sole ground of appeal is an alleged insufficiency of the evidence, plain tiffs deem it
well to emphasize at the beginning of the argument that
this is a case at law. This is an action to enforce the
provisions of a written lease of real property wherein
no equitable issues are involved. In such a case under
the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of
Utah, to-wit:

"* * * in cases at law the appeal shall be on
queRtions of law alone,''
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it is too well settled to require citation of authority
that it is the function of this court not to pass upon
the weight of the evidence nor to determine conflicts
therein, but to examine it solely for the purpose of
determining whether or not the judgment finds substantial support in the evidence.
Defendant does not seem to contend, at least in
some respects, that the ·plaintiffs' evidence was not
substantial within the meaning of the rule. At page
10 of the brief, it speaks of the question of overload,
saying "the evidence is in direct conflict." At the same
page it speaks of ·its own expert as "better qualified
than any other expert at the trial.'' At page 8 the
brief admits that "plaintiffs' experts testified that the
sole cause of the collapse was overload."
Plaintiffs will proceed to state briefly the evidence
which supports each of the court's findings attacked in
the order such findings :are mentioned in the defend·
ant's brief.

POINT I.
The following evidence supports the trial court's
Findings of Fact No. 3 to the effect that defendant
''stored certain materials therein in such amounts and
in such a manner that defendant broke said floor and
sub-flooring or caused said floor :and said sub-flooring
to be broken and smashed, said pilings to be driven
downward and out of line,· and the walls of said building to be broken and pushed out of line, and the whole
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of said structure to be damaged'', and the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 4 that ' 4 defendant has abandoned
said pre1nises and has refused and failed to restore said
premises to as good order and condition as when the
same -..vere entered by defendant, reasonable use and
wear thereof and damages by the elements excepted,
although plaintiffs have demanded that defendant so
restore the premises~ that said damages are in excess
of reasonable wear of said premises.''
Two expert witnesses, structural engineers, were
called by the plaintiff and their testimony supports the
foregoing findings. rrhe witness Koch testified that in
his opinion overloading was the cause of the floor's collapse (R. 54). The witness Gardner testified that in
his opinion overloading was the cause of the collapse
and that water-weakening was not the cause. (R. 80, 82)
There would seem to be no question that there is
sufficient evidence to support the court's findings that
physical damage was caused by the use which defendant made of the building. The lease provided:
''And the said lessee further agrees to deliver up said premises to said lessors at the
expiration of said term in as good order and
condition as when the same were entered upon
by said lessee, reasonable use and wear thereof
and damage b~r the elements excepted * * '~ ''
In order to be absolved of liability for the damage, the
defendant must show that one of the two express exrrptions applies. In this connection, the cases hold
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that the burden of establishing that the damage falls
within one of the exceptions in ''surrender-up'' clauses
absolving a lessee for damage rests upon the lessee. See
Vaughan vs. Mayo Milling Co., 102 S. E. 597 (Virginia);
Rusted vs. Lamport, 183 N. W. 483 (Minnesota) and
Oakland Motor Company vs. Meyer, 174 N. E. 154
(Ohio).
The trial court has found that the damage was not
caused by the elements. The trial court further found
that the damage was caused by the use to which defendant subjected the premises. Defendant contends
that this use was nevertheless reasonable. It argues in
effect that it is not liable if it has complied with a tort
standard of reasonable conduct. It is debatable as to
whether defendant acted prudently in this case, but the
authorities hereafter cited reject such a defense in any
event.
Plaintiffs submit that this exception, ''reasonable
use and wear", contains two elements: (a) The use
must be reasonable. (b) The wear must be reasonable.
The words mean different things. To consider only
the conduct of the defendant and to ignore the physical
result of its tenancy is to deny any force or function
on the part of the word "wear". This is contrary to
fundamental rules of constructions. ''Use'' is defined at
43 Words and Phrases 463, as ''to ·employ for any purpose". Certainly, "wear" means something else than
that. Plaintiffs submit that it means physical chan~e.
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It

i~

diffcult to see how the damage which

wa~ Yi~

ited upon plaintiff's building in this case can be ch:t :·acterized as reasonable wear. Defendant ha~ deserihed
that dmnage as destruction. "\Ye submit that the only
sound policy for the courts to take in a situation of this
sort is to require of a lessee, that if he wishes to be
exempt frmn the consequences of such substantial damage or destruction, he Inust provide by the terms of his
lease that the pren1ises shall be put to a specific use
and that if that use results in damage or destruction~
the lessee shall not be liable therefor.
To accept the contention of the defendant is grotesquely to distort the contract of the parties. It is to
say that the parties agreed that ·plaintiffs would rent
the building to defendant and that if defendant merely
stored newsprint, it mattered not to plaintiffs if the
building should thereby be destroyed or damaged.
This defendant was confronted with an emergency.
It had to secure warehouse space speedily or pay demurrage on freight cars. The defendant appeal<~d to
plaintiffs for warehouse space. The defendant was experienced in the storing of these materials. ThA plaintiffs were not. The written lease contains no warranty
that the building would sustain the materials. It contains no reference to the use to be made of the building.
Unless, by contract it PXpressly provided otherwise:',
defendant assumed the risk of damaging plaintiffs'
building. It is to be noted also that defendant's agc11t~
were apprehensive a~ to the ability of the building to
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hold up under the proposed load. They expressed concern about this. Nevertheless, they proceeded with the
leasing of the building and took the gamble. Nmv in
retrospect they seek to excuse the damage. In the light
of the factors of defendant's superior experience with
this particular type of warehousing, and of the absence
on the part of plaintiffs of any warranty in the lease
that the building would sustain the weights, does the
law now deny plaintiffs' redress~ To do so is to disregard entirely the body of substantive law which holds
that where there is a writing it is the writing, and the
writing alone which creates and defines the parties' rights
and liabilities.
Defendant seeks to escape liability for the damage
caused plaintiffs' building during defendant's tenancy,
upon the plea that Hie use made of the building was
reasonable. The court's attention is invited to the language of the lease-the lessee is to return the premises
in the same condition as they were in when rented"reasonable use and wear excepted". Even if the "use"
made of the building by defendant be considered "reasonable"-(to which postulate the ·plaintiffs dissent)that alone does not absolve defendant. The covenant
of the defendant is not a covenant merely to make reasonable use of the building-it is an absolute covenant
to do a specific thing----to-wit: to return the premises
to plaintiff in the same condition as when rented, reasonable use and wear excepted. In addition to inquiring
into the use made of the building by tenant, the test of
''what wear has the building sustained?'' must be ap-
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plied. The wear in this instance rertainly is abnormal.
The proposition here urged by the plaintiffs is
simply the common-law rule which was recognized by
the court in Powell Y~. Hughes Orphanage (138 S. E.
637, Virginia), in whirh case there was a lease of a
building in which the lessee covenanted ''to leave said
premi~es in good repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted''. The tenant used the building as a warehouse
and sections of the building in which tobacco was stored,
collapsed. The theory of the plaintiff was that the collapse was caused by overloading. Defendant contended
it was caused by breaking down of piers in the basement
which supported columns on all the floors, and that there
\Vas a structural defect undiscoverable to tenant and
that if pier~ hacl had the strength they appeared to
have no collapse would have occurred.
The court at p. 644 (9, 10) says:
"The covenant to leave the premises in good
repair, unaffected by statute, was not a covenant
to use due care to leave them in good repair, but
an absolute covenant to do a specific thing, towit: to leave the premises in good repair * * *
This was the common law rule * * * ''
(The court then refers to a Virginia .statute modifying the rule.)
Plaintiffs submit that the reasoning of the court
above set forth is applicable to the case at bar; that
the defendant breached its covenant to return the premi~P~ in the same condition as when rented.
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Plaintiffs respectfully ask the court to consider the
logic attending the use in the ''surrender-up'' covenants
of leases of such phrases as ''reasonable wear and tear
excepted" or "reasonable use and wear excepted". Were
it not for the fact that some wear of a building is inevitable, a lessor would wish his building returned in the
identical state in which it is leased. The exception clauses
are used to excuse the lessee from liability for usual
wear-such deterioration or wearing as always are expected to occur. If the use made of the building results
in unusual damage it would seem that the lessee should
bear the damage, "?nless by the contract the lessor has
warranted that the building is suitable for the specific
use or has absolved the lessee of liability for any damage resulting from the specific use. Such a principle
seems to have been recognized in the Powell case (supra)
where a requested instruction that the landlord could
not recover for damage to the building if the tenant
used ordinary care in using the building as a storage
warehouse and acted on the !advice of a competent building contractor, was held to have been properly refused
in the absence of evidence that landlord undertook to
put building in condition to use for storage purposes.
In other words, there was no warranty or undertaking
by the landlord respecting the suitability of the building for the use to which it was to be put.
POINT II.
The following evidence supports the trial court's
finding No. 5 to the effect that the reasonable cost of
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restoring said premises to as good order and condition
as when the same were entered by the defendant, reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the elements
excepted, is $3,000.00.
The witness Gardner, called by plaintiffs, testified
to the items necessary to make repairs (R. B2, 83, 84,
85) and testified that in his opinion the reasonable cost
of the repairs would be $5,051.21 (R. 86). The defendant's own witness, Ullrich, testified that in his opinion
the cost of repairs, not taking into account the floor
-covering and the gas and electrical systems, would be
$2,450 (R. 175).
POINT III.
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding
that the defendant is liable for rent.
In its argument upon this point, defendant presupposes lack of fault on its own part. As has been previously pointed out, there is substantial evidence from
which the court did find that the defendant through its
own act caused the damage. After that finding there
can be no reasonable argument that the liability for
rent ceases. There would seem to be no reason to
consider the rules applicable where damage comes to the
leased premises without fault of the lessee. But sinee
the defendant contends for certain propositions which
assume the damage by an unavoidable casualty unrelated to the acts of the lessee, plaintiffs will consider
those contentions.
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Defendant's brief at page 12 cites the minority
views and particularly the viewes of Brewer, J. in an
early l{ansas case and later quoted in a later case.
That view, we think, is properly analyzed in footnote
1010, page 1193, I Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant as
follows:
"The op1n10n of Brewer, J., in Whitaker
v. Rawly, 25 Kan. 674, 37 Am. Rep. 277, argues
strongly in favor of relieving the tenant in case
of destruction of the building. It is submitted,
however, that the learned writer of the opinion,
in saying that a lease 'is an agreement for a continuous interchange of values between landlord
and tenant, rather than a purchase single and
completed of a term or estate in lands,'' takes
a view of a lease which is contrary to the common-law authorities, though in accordance with
that of the civil law.''
Plaintiffs do not feel it necessary to pursue further the defendant's theory that such rule of law is
not adapted to present-day conditions in our state in
view of the decision of our highest court in the case
of Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 P. 3"08. The
plaintiff in that case suffered personal injuries, his wife
was killed and his property was damaged all in the
collapse of part of a building leased. The court affirmed
a judgment of dismissal, the opinion ending with the
following statement:
''We think the evidence in this case clearly
shows that the injuries sustained resulted from
defects in the 'premises demised to the plaintiff,
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"~hich

risk he
his lease.''

a~snmed

when he entered under

If a lessee can and does, absent stipulation to the
contrary, legally assume such risks of death, injury and
damage to his property and such has been confirmed
a~ a Yalid and subsisting part of the law of this state,
can it be seriously argued that social considerations
require this court to hold that such lessee cannot legally
assume liability for payment of rent (certainly a much
lesser risk) regardless of certain contingencies because
in the event of the happening of such contingency such
payment may be harsh as to him 1 Plaintiffs believe
the cited case disposes of defendant's contentions in
this regard and that the same case is a valuable precedent in the other phase of the present action a~ will
be hereafter noted.
Defendant further argues that the present case is
a lease of "merely a portion of a building". In this
connection plaintiffs believe that the defendants haYe
reached a conclusion which is at least questionable,
and have apparently done so without an examination
of the authorities. Plaintiffs believe that ·a determination of this point is not essential to a proper disposition of this phase of the action before the court for the
reasons hereafter more fully set forth, but propose to
examine the point briefly since a determination favorable to the defendant would be a necessary step in
further examination of its said contention. Defendant
states in its statement of ''admitted facts'' that there
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was "no leasing of the land''. No authority or reason
is given for this interpretation of the written lease. It
is, of course, patent that the question of whether any
particular lease includes an interest in land as distinguished from an interest in an improvement only is a
question of interpretation in the particular transaction
involved, unless the parties state an intention in express
language. There are the following rules as stated in
the cases and the authorities to aid in such interpretation:
"In regard to when an interest in the land
passes, the general rule is well settled that the
grant of a house, store, mill, or other building
carries with it the land under the building".
4 Thompson on Real Property 255, Section 1726.
Tiffany states that conclusion as a presumption
only:
''It is a question of construction in each
particular case whether a lease of a building
includes the earth or soil, and, as above stated,
there is a presumption in fa:vor of such construction." I Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant 269, Section 26.
The authority last cited further states, "if a lease
is in terms of a room or apartment merely, it prima
facie includes no part of the earth or soil.'' The other
text mentioned contains similar statements at the cited
page.
It is submitted that the two rules of interpretation stated are logical rules to apply in the fact situa-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:>

15

tions mentioned. If a person is given a leasehold intPrest in a ~tructure, it is logical to n~~u1nP, absent a
showing to the contrary, that hi~ leasehold interest includes the earth or soil to which the improvement attaces, and of which the improvement is a part according to ~ettled rules of law. On the other hand where
the leasehold interest is de~cribed as a room or an apartment, there are, in many cases, other parts of the same
.building· above and below which are in the possession
<;>f other tenants or the landlord. It would seem that the
fundamental concept of the common law which viP\\·s
ownership of the surface as extending downward to
the center of the earth and upward to the heavens would
require that such a lease be construed as separating
the right of occupancy of the surface from right~ to
occupy a specific room or apartment.
But it is also submitted that there are, as 1n the
present case, fact situations which do not fit into the
category of a lease of an entire building and which give
more rights than merely the ordinary letting of a room
or apartment. Another example of such a lease not
fitting into either category is the case of a lease of a
modern duplex house where one-half is leased to each
of two different tenants.
11 iffany states at the page and serfion last cited:

''And in the case of one· building, di 'Ticlecl
into two residences by a vertical partition, it
would be a question of construction whether a
lease of one of such residences included the
ground thereunder or adjoin]ng. ''
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Applying the rules to the facts of the present case,
it is further submitted that the following considerations
weigh in favor of a construction that the lease in question included the land: The premises were divided by
a vertical partition. There were no rooms or other parts
of the building above or below the leased portion. The
ingress and egress was by docks directly into the leased
premises, and not through parts of the building retained
by the landlord.
One test would be to assume that the ground below
the floor was valuable for storage purposes and that
this lessor had brought an action against this lessee to
prevent him from using such space to store materials
of the lessee. In view of the nature of the building and
the terms of the lease and the circumstances attending
its execution it is felt that this court would decide in
favor of the lessee and hold there was a right to so
use the land.
If the proper construction of the lease is as indicated and the same included the land under the building, the defendant virtually admits liability for rent
unless this court wishes to reject the majority rule hereinbefore indicated, even if we assume, contrary to the
findings of the tri:al court that the damage was not caused
by the lessee.
POINT IV.
The lease upon which this suit is based provides
"that the said lessee will pay * * * all costs and
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attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the covenants of this lease.'' Plaintiffs submit
that this court should award plaintiffs attorney's fees
in addition to the a:ward of the trial court, or should
remand the case to the district court for the purpose of
making a finding and award of additional attorney's
fees, said additional fees to be for the services of plaintiffs' counsel subsequent to trial of this action.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits:
1. That there is sufficient evidence to support the

findings and judgment of the trial court and that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
2. That this court, pursuant to the lease of the parties, should award plaintiff additional attorney's fees
or remand the case to the district court for that purpose.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
and

ALLEN & RUCKENBP,OD,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Received two copies of foregoing brief this 1st
day of June, 1950.

Attorneys for Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

